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Classification, Roy Boyne 
Abstract 
 
First thoughts about classification inevitably turn to the simultaneously mundane and 
extraordinary ambition to capture the universe of all that there is and has been.  This 
dream of the universal has two basic modes (and so the process begins!).  We will 
follow the spirit of theos and logos as represented by the Platonic embrace of totality 
enshrined in Socrates’ scrupulous rejection of rhetorical dishonesty.  Secondly we will 
address the later part of the march to subjectivity as expressed by the mechanics of 
atomism and Cartesian reduction.  Following  this move from theology to ontology, 
from in other words the post-synthetic to the post-analytic, we will connect with the 
sociological destruction of such pretensions to absolute classificatory veracity – a 
necessary pre-requisite for the engagement of reflexivity and classification to be 
found in the work of Georges Perec. 
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Classification   
Roy Boyne 
 
Introduction 
 
Durkheim and Mauss (1969: 5) thought that classification has a history.  To be 
more accurate, it has histories.  I will refrain from attempting to classify all the 
histories of classification that research might produce, for that would surely take us 
into Borges’ Library of Babel.   Instead I will provide just two examples.  For some 
mathematicians, classification analysis is used to identify structured groups within 
data. Mathematical techniques of cluster and classification analysis are used in 
economics, medicine, biology, astronomy, marketing, indeed all disciplines and 
projects where pattern recognition matters (consider the link between CCTV and face 
recognition: a surveillance technology that is in its infancy).  On the other hand, staff 
in the CIA, think that classification is concerned with marking and protecting 
information vital to national security. Roosevelt was responsible for the very first 
Executive Order, EO 8381, signed in March, 1940, which specified the framework for 
handling secret US information of military significance, and which, for example, gave 
the basis for handling the details of the Manhattan Project.  
We are at the provisional end point, then, of a number of histories.  The 
particular history, if indeed it is singular, that I am concerned with is that of  the 
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encyclopaedia.  Although I am not concerned with the encyclopaedia as such, but 
with its transcendental presuppositions, and would like to offer three instantiations of 
the priori thinking that has under girded the theory and practice of encyclopaedism. 
 
 It may have been possible to believe in the premiss of the Universal 
Exhibition in Paris in 1900, that its 18 groups and 121 classes of items 
exhibited stood without need of qualification or justification.   
 It remained the case in the late 1940s and 1950s that the US academy 
was the site of the project of a unified science which would incorporate 
the social sciences.  
 In the 1960s the incorporation of the study of languages and 
communication under the general rubric of semiology was a serious 
intellectual aim.  
These three rapidly traversed examples follow a transcendental logic which Perec 
describes in the following terms: 
So it was imagined that the entire world could be distributed 
according to a unique code, that one universal law would reign 
over the totality of phenomena: two hemispheres, five 
continents, masculine and feminine, animal and vegetable, 
singular plural, right left, four seasons, five senses, six vowels, 
seven days, twelve months, twenty-six letters. (Perec 1985: 
155) 
This dream of the universal, Perec tells us, does not, did not and never will work.  
In what follows, I will pursue this dream of the universal in both of its modes.  
First we will follow the spirit of theos and logos as represented by the Platonic 
embrace of totality.  Secondly we will address the mechanics of atomism in the case 
of Cartesian reduction.  I will follow this shift from theology to ontology, from the 
post-synthetic to the post-analytic, with the destruction of these pretensions to 
absolute classificatory veracity.  This destruction was contained, from the beginning, 
within sociology.  Finally, I will return to Perec, ending with the semi-plagiaristic 
acronym – PROCLAP. 
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 Platonic Classification 
 
The opening problem of classification is inescapably connected with the 
totality of human knowledge of what exists.  What are the criteria for genuine 
knowledge?  How is the totality of this genuine knowledge mapped?  The known 
history of such encyclopaedic concerns begins with the pre-Socratic philosophers.  It 
is generally said about them that enquiry into the nature of the cosmos, what its 
essence might be, is where Thales and Anaximander began.  Heraclitus, who made the 
famous observation that one cannot step into the same river twice, thought that flux 
was the key to cosmological understanding.  This did not mean an evacuation of 
guiding principles.  On the contrary, he thought of war and also of fire as elemental.  
The Heraclitean position is that any given state of affairs is but a temporary resolution 
of the conflict of opposing forces. In contrast, consider Parmenides.  The core of his 
thinking was the recognition of a divine ‘motionless heart of well-rounded truth’ 
against which is set the opinions of mortals.  The latter will be tested to destruction.  
The seeds of law, doctrine and dogma are encapsulated in Parmenides, while those of 
dialectic, debate and compromise emerge from Heraclitus.  The work of Socrates and 
Plato feeds from both traditions, taking us from imagination and myth into 
epistemology, and the first glimmerings of a reflexive understanding of classification. 
The major part in Plato’s late dialogue The Sophist is taken by an unnamed 
stranger from Elea.  He is introduced as a disciple of Parmenides and also of Zeno, 
who was a pupil of Parmenides.  The dual influence becomes clear as the stranger 
deploys a combination of logic and unquestioned assertion concerning the detailed 
operations of the world in order to bring out the distinction between philosophy and 
sophistry. Robinson and Denniston summarise the core of the dialogue as follows: 
Sophistry entails falsehood, which entails ‘not-being’, which 
seems self-contradictory.  ‘Being’ is no better; it raises 
difficulties alike for pluralists, monists, materialists, and 
immaterialists; it is neither rest nor motion, yet everything 
must either rest or move.  The solution is the doctrine of 
‘communication’.  Some things communicate with each other, 
so that we can sometimes truly say ‘A is B’. (11) 
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Applying the doctrine of communication means investigating to find out the 
precise class and subsequent sub-classes to which the object of the enquiry belongs.  
In this dialogue between an accomplished stranger and the young Theaetetus, the aim 
is to define through classification what a sophist is.  The essential identity of the 
sophist is established by determining the class to which it belongs.  This is not a 
procedure that Theaetetus will know.  It is, if not a new form of thinking entirely, at 
least an exercise at a new level of rigour and complexity.  He will need some 
coaching.  So they start with an apparently simple and familiar case.  What is the 
definition of an angler?  Are Anglers acquisitive or creative?  Do they proceed by 
exchange or force?  Is their method open or concealed?  If they hunt live prey, is it 
land or water-based?  Do they net, spear or hook them?  Thus the stranger from Elea 
takes Theaetetus through the Athenian equivalent of a platform game, and, having 
traversed the various levels one by one, sums it up as follows: 
Within expertise as a whole one half was acquisitive; half of 
the acquisitive was taking possession; half of possession-
taking was hunting; half of hunting was animal-hunting; half 
of animal-hunting was aquatic hunting; all of the lower 
portion of aquatic hunting was fishing; half of fishing was 
hunting by striking; and half of striking was hooking.  And the 
part of hooking that involves a blow drawing a thing upward 
from underneath is called by a name that’s derived from its 
similarity to the action itself, it’s called draw-fishing or 
angling – which is what we’re searching for. (Plato 241) 
Proceeding now to the real task, the stranger soon defines the sophist as a 
hunter, whose weapon is flattery and whose prey is young wealthy men.  But this is 
no end to the matter.  Further consideration reveals the sophist to be capable of being 
classified in other ways.  If seen as a practitioner of exchange rather than a hunter, he 
comes to be seen as a virtue merchant, trading in his own or in others’ wisdoms.  And 
yet another line can be drawn from the subdivision of the forms of acquisitive 
expertise, now classifying the sophist as a member of ‘the money-making branch of 
expertise in debating, disputation, controversy, fighting, combat and acquisition’ 
(Plato 246) The sophist is, the stranger observes, a complex beast.   
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The question for us, in regard to the matter of classification, appears to be 
whether it is the apparent many-sidedness of the sophist or the seeming singularity of 
the angler which is paradigmatic?  In fact, what Plato does in this dialogue is to show 
that the pursuit of understanding through the search for what something is need not be 
about finding the essential identity of the thing.  It can equally well be about 
discovering connections, that there is a link between the hunter and the sophist, but 
also between the merchant and the sophist, and so on.  In this way, Plato transcends 
the Parmenidean injunction that the truth is not reached by tracking what something is 
not.  Parmenides had written, ‘…you can neither know what is not (for it is 
impossible) nor tell of it’ and ‘Only one story of the way is still left: that a thing is.’ 
(Coxon 1986: 52, 60; see also Heidegger 1992)  Now, Plato moves beyond this search 
for the absolute core of the existent, and begins to pursue its understanding through its 
connectivities elsewhere.  It is at this point that the very possibility of classification is 
born as the pursuit of defined associations.  Classification is not about equivalence but 
about association, and Plato’s rejection of the Parmenidean insistence on the one 
single story affirms – to Plato’s own consternation – a fundamental link between 
associative classification and the narrative imagination. 
There are dangers here.  A movement away from Parmenidean essentialism 
might invite caprice and falsehood.  How are we to tell which associations are 
truthful?  Plato does not pose nor answer the question clearly, but he does recognise 
the importance of discernment and discrimination in the search for a true 
understanding of the classes into which things fall.  The stranger says: 
…he who can divide rightly is able to see one form pervading 
a scattered multitude, and many different forms contained 
under one higher form…This is the knowledge of classes 
which determines where they can have communion with one 
another and where not. (Plato, The Sophist: 31) 
Plato thought there to be a true order of classes for any given phenomenon but 
only had rhetorical method available to him for arriving there.  Hence his recourse to 
general qualities of discernment, and his subsequent clarification that discernment and 
discrimination are operations of purification.  Also, it is here easy to see why the 
differences between the true philosopher and the problematic sophist would be of 
great concern.   
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The philosopher is the one who ‘can divide rightly’ and determine where 
‘communion’ is possible and where not.  Defence against false classification would be 
enshrined in education, the teaching by rote of the true understandings and laws of the 
city.  The defence against falsehood, at the time of the birth of classification, is a 
major concern of domestic politics, as we can see in The Laws (292), in which Plato 
writes: ‘change, we shall find, except in something evil, is extremely dangerous.’  
This comment, made while discussing education, makes complete sense only if we 
understand that there was then no secure method  for arriving at or testing 
classifications.  Education was the means of hanging on to the ones which were 
established.  The concept of research was not yet born.  Education was social defence. 
 
Cartesian Classification 
 
The Eleatic stranger in The Sophist began the work of classification with the whole.  
The totality of human endeavour, abbreviated in the Greek context to the term which 
is  translated as ‘art’ or ‘expertise’ was then divided into smaller constituent totalities, 
and these again into those that were further inferior.  There is no natural stopping 
point for this process, except that determined by its object and purpose.  There was no 
need to distinguish between different kinds of anglers in The Sophist, and hence the 
example could naturally stop where it did.  The aim of the example was the placing of 
what was known in its proper place within the wider universe of known things.  The 
process was not propelled by curiosity but by administration.  It was filing rather than 
research.  When we come to contrast Plato and Descartes, we find the latter to 
proceed differently in three basic respects.   
In the first place, he had been in active pursuit of a method for confirming the 
validity of his apprehensions of the world.  He had laboured to develop a thesis about 
the nature of the mind and its inherent ability to apprehend the world clearly.  In The 
First Meditation, the extended reflection which leads to the phrase cogito ergo sum, 
Descartes’ failure to render apodictic anything other than the certainty of his own 
existence, reinforced the need for methodical care.  His hunting ground was empirical 
reality, but its verities were not secured by his philosophy. Unlike Plato who sought 
understanding on the basis of a faith in timeless form and its apprehension by 
philosophy, Cartesian certainty would, at least in the realm of the objective, be 
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achieved by following rules of procedure. In his Rules for the Direction of the Mind,  
Rule 12 tells us that our ‘intellect, imagination, sense perception, and memory’ allow 
us ‘to intuit simple propositions distinctly’; Rule 5 states: ‘The whole method consists 
entirely in the ordering and arranging of the objects on which we must concentrate our 
mind’s eye if we are to discover some truth’; and Rule 7 warns us to be sure not to 
leave anything out: ‘in order to make our knowledge complete, every single thing 
relating to our undertaking must be surveyed in a continuous and wholly 
uninterrupted sweep of thought.’  The Cartesian method, then, begins with the 
suspicion of established usage and understanding, insisting that such be checked by 
breaking down these views into their component parts in order to be able to stand on 
the firm ground of simple intuitions. As he put it in The Discourse on Method, he 
resolved to conduct his thoughts 
In an orderly way, beginning with the simplest objects and the 
easiest to know, in order to climb gradually , as by degrees, as 
far as the knowledge of the most complex… (Descartes 1968: 
41) 
The second difference is already implicit in the foregoing.  Plato began with 
the complex and divided it up, deriving from it groups of less complexity.  Descartes, 
in contrast, aspired to begin from basic elements.  Rule 20 continued,  ‘…we first 
reduce complicated and obscure propositions step by step to simpler ones, and then, 
starting with intuition of the simplest ones of all, try to ascend through the same steps 
to a knowledge of all the rest.’ (20)  There is a good example of Descartes’ method at 
work in the last thing that he published, The Passions of the Soul.  He takes issue with 
previous classifications of the passions, especially with that found in Plato’s Republic, 
and finds that there are six primitive passions, all of which relate to the function of 
leading us ‘to want the things which nature deems useful for us, and to persist in this 
volition.’ (349)  These six primitive passions are wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and 
sadness.  He goes on, in his analysis, to show that esteem, contempt, generosity, 
vanity, humility, veneration, scorn, hope, anxiety, confidence, despair, jealousy, 
irresolution, courage, fear, remorse, derision, envy, pity, tranquillity, repentance, 
gratitude, ingratitude, indignation, anger, pride, shame, impudence, disgust, regret, 
and cheerfulness are all modalities or mixtures of the six primitive passions.  
Whatever the merits of his analysis, the paradigm is clear: theory of passions, 
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classification of the elemental kinds, survey of the entire field in terms of element, 
allotrope and hybrid. 
The third difference between the Platonic and Cartesian approaches to 
classification is now evident.  Cartesian intuition of simple truths simultaneously 
allows and is reinforced by a fundamental understanding of pan-ontological 
processes.  These processes are seen as unfailingly mechanical.  The functional basis 
of the classification of the passions is meant to be (whether or not it is so is beyond 
our scope here) subordinate to a mechanical worldview.  In his treatise on light, 
Descartes discusses the elements of fire, air and earth in terms of ‘the size, shape and 
motion of their parts’ (Descartes in Cottingham et al  89).  He then goes on to say the 
following: 
If you find it strange that in explaining these elements I do not 
use the qualities heat, cold, moisture and dryness – as the 
philosophers do – I shall say to you that these qualities 
themselves seem to me to need explanation.  Indeed unless I 
am mistaken, not only these four qualities but all others as 
well, including even the forms of inanimate bodies, can be 
explained without the need to suppose anything in their matter 
other than the motion, size, shape and arrangements of its 
parts. 
In demonstration of this, as it were, Descartes’ account of the six primitive passions is 
elaborated in terms of their bodily concomitants, and all are ‘caused, maintained and 
strengthened by some movement of the spirits’(333), which are, for him, ‘the finest 
parts of the blood.’ (331) 
 
The Sociology of Classification 
Although Descartes does move the underlying potentiality of classification from the 
administration of the given toward the orchestration of the possible, there remains 
much more to be done.  In particular, it will be necessary to test the remaining links 
between classification and truth.  Our understanding of this begins with Emile 
Durkheim and Marcel Mauss. 
Durkheim and Mauss introduced dirt and contamination into the perception of 
the classification process.  They thought that classification is ‘a process into which all 
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sorts of foreign elements enter.’ (Durkheim and Mauss 1969: 8)   Classification is not 
something which happens naturally.  They wanted to know how classifications came 
about.  They tried to look at the most fundamental classifications to see how they 
were constructed.  They thought that fundamental meant primitive, and in Primitive 
Classification, they argued that the most primitive forms of classification are to be 
found in Australian tribes, and their general conclusion was that their classifications 
reflect their social structure. 
 
The individuals of the clan, the creatures of the totemic species, and those of 
related species, all these are nothing but diverse aspects of one and the same 
realities.(20) 
They saw that the primitive classificatory function appeared slow to change.  
They were linking its rhythms to those of social change. In the aboriginal context that 
had been extraordinarily slow.  They tried to test the notion that classification systems 
and social systems form a unity.  They did this for Australia, North America, and 
finally subjected it to what they thought of as the most difficult test of all: ‘the 
astronomical, astrological, geomantic and horoscopic divinatory system of the 
Chinese.’  (67)  If the premisses of their own analysis are accepted, that the structures 
of the simplest societies will reveal themselves clearly reflected in classificatory and 
religious systems, while those in later societies will be less likely to be clearly 
mirrored within such definite frames, then what they find in their researches is 
confirmatory.   When looking at the Zuni of North America, they find a division of 
space into seven regions, and they find that reflected within the social system. As they 
put it, ‘this division of the world is exactly the same as that of the clans within 
pueblo.’ (44)  When it comes to the exceedingly complex Chinese case they  move 
from a simple position where the classification reflects and is the social arrangement 
to one where any single classification is less revelatory and is just a part of  the social 
arrangement.  So, in the Chinese case, following a brief analysis of the complexities 
of the twelve year cycle which moves from the year of the rat through tiger, dragon, 
dog and finally to pig, they comment, ‘we clearly have to do with a multitude of 
interlaced classifications which, in spite of their contradictions, grasp reality closely 
enough to provide a fairly useful guide to action.’ (73)    
One problem with their research in the Australian, North American and 
Chinese cases is that their evidence base is secondary and always potentially 
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unreliable, if only because it was often collected under conditions of methodological 
compromise.  However, this should not obscure the importance of the sociological 
insight that classificatory systems are both part of society and also potentially 
expressive of fundamental social dynamics.  Durkheim and Mauss coded this 
conclusion in their statement (83-4) that systems of classification are inevitably 
hierarchical (a view which prefigures deconstruction, and predates it by more than 
half a century).  But they did not really explore that insight.  That was left to be 
developed with the advent of deconstruction in the 1970s.  To see what did follow, we 
need to more forward to the work of Lévi-Strauss.  
For Lévi-Strauss, the advent of society is already the advent of classifications.  
For "primitive" societies the origins of the classificatory systems are largely forgotten.  
But, in some way, the classified orderliness of social existence is reproduced from 
generation to generation, and this fact is by no means undermined or weakened by the 
citation of those societies undergoing radical transformations or by those in a state of 
war (pace Heraclitus).  We have been taught this lesson again and again, by civil wars 
across the world.  If classifications are reproduced, from generation to generation, 
how does this happen?  Lévi-Strauss rejected Durkheim's Platonist conception of a 
collective conscience detached from the individual members of the society, and 
adopted Marcel Mauss's adaptation that the sociological structures the psychological 
through the process of upbringing.  The deeply sociologically saturated upbringing 
which is characteristic of any process of socialisation shapes and constructs individual 
minds so that the "objective world" is understood from within a particular framework 
of classifications.  Lévi-Strauss did not agree with the ethnocentric and 
developmentalist view that  “primitive societies” employed false assumptions and 
inadequate systems of classifications which could be shown to be false and inadequate 
when compared to the systems of twentieth-century Europe.  Although the latter 
systems might be more complex than the former, they did not necessarily relate along 
the same continuum since the essential characteristic of the ordered framework of 
assumptions, in either case, was not its adequacy to some mythical "real world" but, 
rather, its very order.  At some level, the specific detail of a social structure is less 
important than its being as classificatory structure, as patterned, as reproducible.  As 
Lévi-Strauss put it, "Any classification is superior to chaos, and even a classification 
at the level of sensible properties is a step towards rational ordering" (1962 (1966: 
15)).  What Lévi-Strauss calls the "Neolithic paradox" illustrates the point: 
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It was in Neolithic times that man's mastery of the great arts of 
civilisation - of pottery, weaving, agriculture, and the 
domestication of animals - became firmly established.  No one 
today would any longer think of attributing these enormous 
advances to the fortuitous accumulation of a series of chance 
discoveries or believe them to have been revealed by the 
passive perception of certain natural phenomena…what would 
happen if copper ore had accidentally found its way into a 
furnace [?] complex and varied experiments have shown that 
nothing happens at all.  The simplest method of obtaining 
metallic copper which could be discovered consists in 
subjecting finely ground malachite to intense heat in a pottery 
dish crowned with an inverted clay pot…(13-14) 
We do not know what set of classifications of the world allowed for the discovery of 
copper, but we do know - Lévi-Strauss implies - that there had to be one; and, in some 
way, that classification system  would have been carried in people's minds in much 
the same way that grammatical classifications are (mostly) unwittingly carried in the 
minds of language users.  The sociological realisation that the relation between 
classification and reality is not that of attempted duplication with changes explained 
by increasing verisimilitude constitutes a definitive break with both Platonism and 
Cartesianism.  It is, interestingly, now reflected in the mathematical understanding of 
classification theory, where one mathematician discovering four clusters in a data set 
defines their reality not in terms of their underlying referents, but in terms of the 
methodological conventions employed within the mathematical community. 
 
Doing Classification 
 
Plato saw the subversive potential in re-classification (Murdoch 1977). Even 
Descartes could apprehend the possibility of order ‘among those objects which do not 
precede each other naturally.’  Lévi-Strauss thought classification  to be rather like a 
form of magic, in the sense that it is not how classification reflects the world which 
matters, but rather its effect on the world deriving from its internal arrangement.  
There is an extant model for thinking this through.  It is enshrined in the group called 
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OuLiPo, an abbreviation for the phrase Ouvroir pour littérature potentielle: workshop 
for potential literature. 
OuLiPo was formed in 1960, following a colloquium on the French language, 
at Cérisy-la-Salle.  Its leader and inspiration was Raymond Queneau (incidentally the 
editor of the Pléïade encyclopaedia), and his interest was in the intersections between 
poetry and mathematics, and also in the study of language as it is spoken on the street.  
While OuLiPo was modelled on the French mathematical group Bourbaki which was 
comprised of a number of anonymous mathematicians, it was not a secret society 
although it did have very strict rules.  For example, resignation was impossible.  Even 
death did not mean withdrawal, only permitted absence from meetings.  In March 
1967, Georges Perec was invited to join the group – only its second new member 
since its inception seven years earlier.  When Perec gave an unheralded talk at the 
University of Warwick a couple of months later,  he described his 1965 publication, 
Les Choses, in terms of a jigsaw puzzle whose pieces included work by Barthes and 
Flaubert.  The conception that Perec had was that he should write the text which 
completed the picture which would then be made by the pieces he started with and the 
one he had fashioned.  His interest was in putting things together.   Perec was, 
however, also located within that lineage which seeks to emancipate classification 
from its functions for social utility, freeing it for the creation of serendipitous 
wonderment.  He stopped short, however, of declaring that re-classification would 
somehow illustrate the  road to social revolution.  Whether this was a rejection of 
sociology or of political will, is a judgement we shall have to come to.  
Michel Foucault thought incomprehensible the world which Borges 
summoned up in his ‘The analytical language of John Wilkins’ where the Celestial 
Emporium of Benevolent Knowledge divides the creatures of the world into:  
• those that belong to the Emperor,  
• embalmed ones,  
• those that are trained,  
• suckling pigs,  
• mermaids,  
• fabulous ones,  
• stray dogs,  
• those included in the present classification,  
• those that tremble as if they were mad,  
• innumerable ones,  
• those drawn with a very fine camelhair brush,  
• others,  
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• those that have just broken a flower vase,  
• those that from a long way off look like flies.  
However, fantasies of alternative orderings of things are clear to see within the 
narrative tradition from Homer forward.  What they may always fail to do is escape 
the imprint of their time.  Although it may not always be easy to find and read its 
signs.  There was, then, a touch of willed naïveté about Foucault’s citation of Borges.  
He knew such a list could be read, even if the reading was beyond the reader at a 
particular juncture.  Perec was uneasy with this sociological truth.  His uneasiness has 
three sources.  He had an understanding of everyday life in emergent consumer 
society as programmed and somewhat lifeless (the final sentence of his 1965 novel, 
Les Choses, a quasi-ethnographic treatment of the everyday life of a young Parisian 
couple, reads, ‘Mais le repas qu’on leur servira sera franchement insipide.’).  Second 
he had a poet’s desire to imagine other places, and thirdly he saw that even imposed 
classification systems were capable of operative perversion and innumerable forms of 
parody.  Perec was well aware that there is a difference between classification and its 
subsequent use, and he provided an extended example of this difference when  he 
tried to record everything he'd eaten and drunk over 12 months, placing his notes in 
his Attempt at an Inventory of the Liquid and Solid Foodstuffs Ingurgitated by Me in 
the Course of the Year Nineteen Hundred and Seventy-Four (he eat beef, chicken, 
pork, paté, cheese, tart and cake, rabbit, fish and offal, drank 141 specified bottles of 
wine and admitted a failure to record how many other casual verres de rouge he had 
drunk; he seemed to take pastis or a glass of cognac or eau de vie every other day, but 
hardly a bottle of beer a month, and he may have been a ‘pudding man’, listing pies, 
tarts, mousses, charlottes, babas, gateaux, ice creams, and sorbets [Jack: 2004]) .  The 
interest in life, thought and classification is a constant in his work, appearing not only 
in his text, Penser/classer to which we now turn. 
Perec begins with the apparent paradox that thinking is not in control of what 
is thought.  He begins by rehearsing some fairly obvious moves: thought is fleeting, 
incomplete, fragmentary.  Should we not preserve its granulation rather than try to put 
it in some sort of order?  If that is avoiding the issue, we can take this line of thinking 
into apparent depth by positing a line from thinking to the unthinkable, and from 
classifying to the unclassifiable.  If it is here already a question of starting again, then 
perhaps we should begin in a more practical way – with a few questions.  When I 
think have I already been engaged in classification, or is it vice-versa?  Do I think 
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differently when I am explicitly trying to classify?  How do I classify the verbs of 
classification?  Perec could have gone back to Plato or Descartes for a lesson or two, 
but instead he leaves his list – which there seems little point in translating, unless to 
remind ourselves that there are wider classification resources at our disposal - 
suspended (and is this act of suspension not already part of an operation of 
classification): 
Cataloguer, classer, classifier, découper, énumérer, grouper, 
hiérarchiser, lister, numéroter, ordonnancer, ordonner, 
ranger, regrouper, répartir…subdiviser, distribuer, 
discriminer, caractériser, marquer, definer, dinstinguer, 
opposer, etc. (1989: 154-5) 
He knows that the Inuit have a number of words for ice, that the English have 
more words for a residential street than the French, that both have more than the Inuit, 
and that if you walk into a confectioners and ask for a packet of sweets, then you will 
be asked which kind you want.  He does not, however, draw the explicit conclusion 
that context is determinant in some way, although he might have done, since his 
implicit conclusion regarding the 18 groups and 121 classes which ordered the 
contents of la grande Exposition Universelle in Paris in 1900 is that they derived from 
a necessary dirigisme.  On the contextual conditioning of Shônagon’s nine kinds of 
disagreeable things (the ninth kind – things disagreeable to see – is illustrated by the 
dirty interior curtains of a high dignitary’s ceremonial motor car), Perec says nothing, 
but does reflect that such a listing is not a classification (he might have gone on to 
wonder what it would have meant for these details to have been signalled in an index, 
and did retain an interest in such paraphernalia that were part of the text, but outside it 
in some way [Magné 2004]).  By extension, the same is true of the sorrows of 
Zachary McCaltex, whom, Perec tells us, was, amongst other things, half-devoured by 
a wild cat.  And, by further extension, he notes that neither a collection like Robert 
Kaufman’s 7495 different kinds of cigarettes nor the kind of enumeration one finds in 
The Guinness Book of Records, exemplified by Perec with Walter Cavanagh’s 1003 
valid credit cards, are classifications. His musings suggest family resemblances, and 
one other thing – perhaps some of the classifications we take for granted and use are 
at root mere collections whose contents could be otherwise.  This might be true of 
dictionaries of biography, but also of the rules of grammar (not Perec’s example, 
which is of an algorithm for creating aphorisms, created by Marcel Benabou)?  This is 
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indeed Perec’s provisional conclusion, ‘that the response to the question of 
classification is both completely obvious and utterly obscure, that it has to do with 
trial and error, suspicion, chance and coincidence.’ (173) 
What conclusion can be drawn if the classificatory process is so aleatory?  
Perec sought the limits of self-determination by hypothesizing a complex and 
rewarding life that would not engage in the arbitrary game of re-classification.  It is 
possible to think that this was a rejection of the illusions of both sociology and 
politics.  This rejection is to be found in Perec’s masterpiece, La vie mode d’emploi, a 
700 page written pictorialisation of the inhabitants – both animate and inanimate – of 
the ten-level house at 11, rue Simon-Crubellier.  The fulcrum is Bartlebooth’s grand 
project, the devotion of his life to a discrete task, sufficiently arduous to be 
compelling, but both capable of completion and sufficiently self-contained and self-
cancelling in its completion to have no pretence at contributing to any sense or hope 
of social significance.  In 1925, Bartlebooth will take one lesson a day for ten years in 
the practice of watercolour painting.  Between 1935 and 1955, he will travel to five 
hundred seaports across the world producing one watercolour of each port.  After each 
is done he will send them, one by one, to a master craftsman, Gaspard Winckler.  
Winckler will turn each watercolour into a wooden jigsaw puzzle of 750 pieces.  
From 1955 to 1975, Bartlebooth will complete the puzzles at the same rate as they 
were painted.  As each puzzle is completed, ‘the seascape would be ‘retexturised’ so 
that it could be removed from its backing, returned to the place where it had been 
painted – twenty years before – and dipped in a detergent solution whence would 
emerge a clean and unmarked sheet…’ (119)  This work of vanishing labour is 
without hope or energy for an outside – which in all its detail is re-presented in the 
form of descriptions of the lives of those who live in the house,  extending in giddying 
fashion into the decorative, physical and architectural themes running through every 
room/story of the house/novel, so that the work is more akin to a super-complex 
narrative Sudoku than perhaps anything else(see Perec 1979, Levy 2004 and Motte 
and Poucel 2004 passim).   
Perec, explaining his own construction methods, Levy, Magné and others 
point out that 42 categories are used in each chapter, one of which being highlighted 
in some way, with the other 41 being subject to variations, ten in all, from room to 
room, with every chapter including two quotes drawn from two lists of authors and a 
single allusion to one of a list of ten works.  Perec and Bartlebooth  appear to be 
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strategically opposite, with the former laying out his methods for all to see, and 
ruminating on what epistemological structures could underlie his work; while 
Batlebooth’s plan is to be consumed in his systematic life but leave no trace of it.  In 
both cases there does seem to be willed  submission  to an arduous regime of 
production.  Bartlebooth’s all-consuming, logistically exhausting, and ultimately 
traceless exercise cannot be completed, since otherwise we would not now be 
considering it as a part of the history of classification.  What Perec’s work brings us to 
is the difference between making and using classifications, and thus perhaps the two 
basic approaches to the history of classification, which is – uncomfortably – already 
to make and operate a classification system.  
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